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1.  Shortcomings of the current taxation 
system for multinational enterprises 
in the EU 
As a rule, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are taxed 
separately by the countries in which they operate on 
the basis of the income produced in each jurisdiction 
(‘source’ taxation).
1 To this end, they must keep 
separate accounts for business units in each country 
(“separate accounting”, SA) ascribing each item of 
expenditure and income to each business unit on the 
basis – by universally accepted convention – of ‘arm’s-
length’ pricing (ALP), that is, of comparable or 
estimated prices for similar market transactions 
between unrelated companies. 
While being in operation for several decades, the 
system has never worked satisfactorily (Klemm, 2001; 
McLure & Weiner, 2000). Integration is only serving 
to amplify these difficulties, since intra-firm 
transactions take on increasing importance in the 
operations of MNEs, and financial market integration 
is expanding the opportunities for tax-planning in 
profit allocation and the debt-financing of capital 
spending. 
Concerning the ALP principle applied by tax 
authorities to prevent profit shifting manipulation, 
Devereux and Keuschnigg (2009) have recently 
devised a model that shows that arm’s length prices 
systematically differ from independent party prices. 
They conclude that the application of ALP distorts 
                                                      
1 Often, the source principle is combined with a residence 
principle for at-least-partial taxation of income earned by 
foreign subsidiaries and branches of resident corporations. 
multinational activity by reducing the debt capacity 
and investment of foreign affiliates, and by distorting 
the organisational choice between direct investment 
and outsourcing.  
Conceptual difficulties are compounded by intractable 
monitoring problems, since each and every transaction 
has to be valued and controlled by tax authorities 
(McLure, 2002). Of course, this is precisely where 
profit-shifting may arise. When tax authorities’ 
opinions differ on what may be the acceptable 
treatment of a particular transaction, double taxation or 
tax loopholes may be engendered. 
Double taxation and tax loopholes may also result 
from the different combination of source and residence 
treatment of cross-border dividend and interest 
payments accruing to the parent company or 
shareholders. Loss offsetting is in general not allowed 
for subsidiaries, and only permitted within (varying) 
limits for branches. Deferral of taxation of profits of 
branches is normally not allowed whereas it is allowed 
for subsidiaries; conflicting tax claims may arise from 
control-foreign-companies (CFC) legislation enacted 
by several countries to counter the booking of profits 
in ‘tax havens’. 
In sum, MNEs in the EU are confronted with huge 
compliance costs in trying to meet the requirements of 
twenty-seven different tax systems and considerable 
uncertainty as to the correct application of the rules. 
Tax authorities are confronted by similarly intractable 
problems in verifying the proper application of ALP; 
conflicting claims on tax bases, double taxation and 
tax loopholes are widespread. 
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Therefore, there are growing calls for an overhaul of 
the current rules on corporate taxation from EU 
companies and national tax authorities, not least in 
view of the stated goal of strengthening the global 
competitiveness of European companies and making 
the Union an attractive area for business. 
The overhaul of the corporate taxation system should 
constitute an opportunity to reduce distortions and 
their resulting inefficiencies. A recent paper 
(Nicodème, 2009) exhaustively reviews this topic, both 
from a domestic and an international point of view, 
and reports recent estimates of distortions in the 
economic literature. The paper ranks shifting between 
capital and labour income at the top of the list of 
distortions. Profit-shifting among jurisdictions set up 
the second most relevant source of distortions. Finally, 
the effects of taxation on business location and foreign 
direct investment are a third source of distortion. 
The academic and expert debate has already identified 
a number of approaches that can be explored to reform 
the current rules. Considerable support has grown at 
EU level for some kind of common-base, consolidated 
taxation of corporate income. Formula apportionment 
would then be used to allocate income among the 
different tax jurisdictions. 
We argue that a radically different approach may also 
be considered that offers great advantages of 
efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation. It entails 
abandoning corporate income as the relevant tax base 
and taxing some broad measure of business activity at 
a moderate rate. 
2.  Coordination of corporate taxation in 
the EU 
The EC Treaty makes no explicit reference to the 
harmonisation of direct taxation, but Article 94 opens 
the way for Community initiatives “for the 
approximation of such laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions of the member states as 
directly affect the establishment and functioning of the 
common market”, which has provided the legal basis 
for existing directives in the field of direct taxation. 
Decisions require unanimity in the Council.  
However, some proposals for the harmonisation of 
corporate tax have been debated within the European 
Community for over 30 years.
2 On the whole the 
arguments for the harmonisation of business taxation 
policies did not appear very convincing; in any event 
                                                      
2 The Neuman Report of 1962 and the Van den Tempel 
Report of 1970 both advocated harmonisation, albeit with 
different systems. In 1975, the Commission published a 
draft of Directive proposing the introduction in all member 
states of a common corporate taxation system with an 
alignment of rate between 45% and 55%. 
they didn’t gain sufficiently broad support among the 
member states of the European Union. In the early 90s 
the Commission decided to concentrate on more 
limited measures that were essential for the 
implementation of the Single Market: several steps 
were taken to reduce the tax obstacles to cross-border 
operations, including the Merger Directive (90/434), 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (90/435) and the 
Arbitration Convention on dispute resolution in 
transfer pricing (90/436). 
Harmful tax competition was first addressed by the 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in a Report 
submitted to the organisation’s Council of Ministers in 
1998; the Council endorsed the proposed (non-
binding) Guidelines for restraining harmful tax 
practices and established a Forum for their 
implementation in member and non-member states. 
The OECD report focused on geographically mobile 
financial and service activities, not specifically on 
business taxation, and provides criteria for the 
identification of harmful preferential tax regimes as 
well as measures to counteract their effects.  
In the European Union, the European Council agreed 
in Dublin in December 1996 on the need to address the 
question of tax competition, which led a year later to 
the European Commission Communication “Towards 
tax coordination in the European Union – a package to 
tackle harmful tax competition” (European 
Commission, 1997). The Communication envisaged a 
coordinated set of measures, known as the ‘Monti 
package’: a Code of Conduct on harmful tax 
competition, measures to harmonise the taxation of 
savings and the elimination of withholding taxes on 
inter-firm payments of interest and royalties. The 
original package clearly had ambitions going well 
beyond the tackling of harmful tax competition and 
into the domain of tax policy harmonisation, but the 
ensuing negotiation has brought it back to its 
‘headline’ goal. The Code of Conduct was approved in 
1998; the rest of the package was approved only in 
2003. 
In the Code of Conduct, the factors for identifying 
harmful tax competition were basically the same as 
those proposed by the OECD, with certain additional 
details concerning discriminatory administrative 
practices. In some respects the scope of the Code was 
broader than the OECD Guidelines, while in others it 
was narrower. It was broader in that it applied to any 
measure capable of influencing the localisation of 
business activities, including those carried on within 
groups. It was narrower because, in conformity with 
Article 90 of the Treaty, it focused on discriminatory 
preferential tax treatments and not on the level of tax 
rates. Even though the Code was not legally binding, it 
required member states to refrain from introducing 
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taxation of business income and to remove the existing 
ones.  
At the end of the nineties, member states asked to the 
Commission to prepare an analytical study of company 
taxation in the European Union. The EC Commission 
study (2001a), published in 2001, was accompanied by 
a Commission Communication (2001b) “Towards an 
Internal Market without tax obstacles: a strategy for 
providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax 
base for their EU-wide activities”. These documents 
observed that the growing integration of goods, 
services and capital markets are magnifying the costs 
and distortions of maintaining different tax systems. It 
provided strong evidence on the size of these 
distortions, as reflected in the very large divergences in 
rates of effective taxation differences in tax bases that 
multiply opportunities for evasion and abuse, and the 
attendant loopholes and duplications of taxation.  
The Commission proposed several approaches for 
providing companies with a consolidated tax base for 
EU-wide activities. The two principal alternatives to 
the current SA/ALP system that gained consensus at 
EU level are the Home State Taxation (HST) and 
Common Consolidated Tax base (CCTB); both entail 
common-base consolidated taxation of MNEs 
corporate income.  
Under HST the common tax base is that of the state of 
legal residence of the parent company; in practice, it is 
a system of mutual recognition of national tax bases 
for the taxation of MNEs whereby companies subject 
to different tax laws would operate side-to-side within 
the same (national) market. Consequently, each tax 
jurisdiction may be required to assess and collect taxes 
on businesses operating under different laws and 
administrative traditions in twenty-seven different 
countries. For this reason, even its proponents have 
acknowledged that HST will not work in practice 
unless the tax (and legal) systems of the participating 
countries can be fairly closely aligned (Klemm, 2001). 
Under CCBT, on the other hand, EU member states 
would have to agree on a common definition of taxable 
income, and MNEs would be allowed to opt for this 
definition of taxable income – consolidated at Union 
level, and then apportioned amongst jurisdictions with 
an agreed formula and taxed with national rates – 
instead of separate taxation in each country under 
SA/ALP. In this case, each tax administration would 
only have to deal, within its borders, with its own 
system and that of the Union. 
Fuest (2008) summarises the main elements of the 
CCCTB proposal reflecting the work of a CCTB 
working group set up by the Commission in 2004: a 
common set of rules for the calculation of taxable 
profits, the common base will be consolidated and 
apportioned to the member states. It should be optional 
and member states will retain autonomy in setting the 
tax rate. The working group recommends introducing 
the CCTB in the framework of enhanced cooperation, 
which means that a subgroup of EU member countries 
could start and other countries may join later. 
The main advantages of this approach are that there 
would be full loss offset within company groups and 
transfer prices would no longer matter (although the 
new system would necessarily stop at the Union’s 
borders, with SA-ALP still applying to intra-group 
activities with business units established in non-EU 
countries). This proposal has some potential to reduce 
administrations and compliance cost (Spengel & 
Wendt, 2007). It is less clear what would happen to the 
efficiency of the allocation of capital (Devereux, 
2004). It has been observed (Fuest, 2008) that it is 
“still missing convincing evidence of direct economic 
benefits from introducing the CCCTB which are 
significant enough to convince member states 
government that the project is worth the effort”.  
The main drawback to this approach concerns intra-
group consolidation, since a uniform 
juridical/accounting model of company group and 
group taxation is not available. Indeed, intra-group 
profit and loss consolidation exists only in some 
member states of the Union, and consolidation rules 
vary considerably among them. Critical issues in this 
regard are the identification of the group, with 
associated notions of controlling and controlled 
companies, and attendant criteria for asset and liability 
consolidation; in addition, all countries have specific 
anti-abuse legislation interfering with such matters as 
loss offsetting or the definition of reserves. In some 
countries a parent company will include the income of 
its subsidiaries in its own, and pay tax accordingly; in 
others the losses of one company may be ‘surrendered’ 
to another company in the group. Given these 
differences, setting common standards for group 
taxation will not be any easier than agreeing on a 
common tax base. 
Another critical element concerns formula 
apportionment (FA).
3 FA is a tool for the allocation of 
income generated by a company that operates in more 
than one jurisdiction, and does not involve the 
consolidation of the profits and losses of related 
companies. Rather, it is basically a ‘presumptive’ 
alternative to SA/ALP that uses variables such as 
assets, sales and the number of workers to apportion 
corporate profits between business units; to function 
properly, it presupposes agreement across tax 
jurisdictions on the definition of business units and the 
taxable base (Weiner, 2005). 
                                                      
3 In the United States formula variation across jurisdictions 
is permitted. Its drawback is that the sum of profit shares 
may then not add up to unity, leading to double taxation or 
tax loopholes, thus reintroducing incentives for profit 
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The contribution of each business unit to overall 
profits is assumed to be proportional to the factors 
included in the formula, with two consequences: first, 
estimated profit shares for each business unit may 
deviate significantly from the actual distribution; and, 
second, the inclusion of a variable in the formula is 
equivalent to taxing that factor of production. On both 
accounts, perverse incentives, distortions and 
efficiency losses may arise. Under formulary 
apportionment, the factors included in the formula 
would in practice be taxed at national rates, therefore 
reinstating fresh incentives for factor and profit 
shifting. The main benefit would be a dramatic 
reduction in red tape and the uncertainties inherent in 
SA/ALP. 
Finally, in spite of remarkable efforts over many years, 
the Commission model was never fully tested with the 
member states to assess the revenue and administrative 
mechanisms. On the whole, it is not surprising 
therefore that the commissioner in charge did not 
manage to gain the Commission’s endorsement and 
that the proposal was not sent to the Council and the 
Parliament for consideration. The project now looks all 
but dead. 
3.  Decentralised presumptive taxation 
of transnational businesses 
Even if it were possible to find satisfactory solutions to 
all the obstacles involved in defining a common 
consolidated base for corporate taxation, a specific 
difficulty would still remain concerning the very 
definition of corporate income. Corporate income is a 
largely conventional accounting magnitude, whose 
definition varies depending on the purpose to be 
served. The increased importance of intangibles and 
human capital in company assets is blurring the 
traditional distinction between current and capital 
spending and changing the nature of risks and 
attendant allowances. Furthermore, the definition of 
taxable income often reflects implicit or explicit 
decisions to favour certain factors of production, forms 
of investment and financing, as well as investment 
locations. Referring to corporate income made sense 
when company taxation was a ‘backstop’ for 
individual taxation within a system aiming at 
comprehensive progressive taxation of personal 
incomes; however, most countries have now 
renounced such ambitions and adopted ‘dual’ income 
taxation that treat capital income more leniently than 
other types of personal incomes. 
And yet, corporate income is not the only possible tax 
base: some form of taxation related to corporate inputs 
or outputs may provide a simpler and more efficient 
way to collect taxes from firms operating cross-border. 
Sadka and Tanzi (1993) once proposed to tax gross 
physical assets of enterprises as an indicator of normal 
or average income. However, today their proposal is 
not likely to provide a reliable indicator of income due 
to the larger weight of intangibles and services in value 
added.
4 A more meaningful base could be offered by 
total gross liabilities, including capital and reserves. 
All discrimination between types of financing would 
then disappear, since equity and debt would be taxed 
alike. However, this variable could only be utilised for 
determining the total consolidated income of MNEs at 
EU level, since there would be no simple way of 
allocating assets and liabilities to decentralised 
business units within a group. Another alternative to 
taxing business through income is the one proposed by 
Bradford (2004) known as “X Tax” for business 
activity, which is a consumption-type tax with a broad 
base that makes a substantial simplification of the tax 
system possible and greater neutrality of taxation with 
respect to decisions about how much, where and in 
what form to invest.  
A radically different approach is also available that 
seems to offer considerable advantages in terms of 
efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation, including 
the full administrative autonomy of national tax 
authorities: it entails taxing at a moderate rate some 
agreed presumptive measure of business activity, such 
as company value added, sales or employment. Of 
course, these are precisely the variables usually 
considered in formula apportionment; here, however, 
they would apply directly without having first to go 
through the complications of finding a common-base 
definition and consolidating company results at EU 
level. Reference to a broad base, with no exemptions 
or deductions, would allow the setting of low statutory 
rates. 
The application of this model requires the adoption of 
pure source taxation. Ideally, further taxation of 
savings income in the recipient country should also be 
avoided; however, agreement on this may prove 
elusive, since it pertains to the domain of personal 
income taxation, a closely guarded reserve of national 
tax policies.  
The choice of the common tax base should avoid 
introducing unwanted incentives or penalties for 
different productive factors, assets and forms of 
financing. There would be no allowance for losses, in 
accordance with a ‘benefit view’ of corporate taxation 
and the stated goal of encouraging productive uses of 
assets. Taxes paid would not be deductible against any 
other tax liability. Interest rate payments on debt 
                                                      
4 The authors were aware of the problem, but still chose 
physical assets precisely because they wanted to encourage 
investment in intangibles (p. 69). However, they probably 
did not foresee at that time that intangibles and services 
would predominate in value-generation in many new 
activities, and that the sole reference to gross assets in their 
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would also be taxed on an equal basis with earnings 
and the commonly observed bias in favour of debt 
financing would be removed. 
Of course, business value added includes profits, and 
to this extent the incentive for companies to 
manipulate transfer prices may well reappear; 
however, this incentive would be much weakened, as 
profits typically represent a fairly small share of total 
value added. A further reason for scrapping income-
related taxation and shifting to some other, output-
related taxation stems from the federal-decentralised 
nature of the Union. While taxing the returns on capital 
at national level can discourage investment, taxing 
companies in exchange for location advantages in each 
country might not entail any similar disincentives, and 
indeed would appear to be ‘horizontally’ efficient. 
Countries offering world class infrastructures, high-
skilled staff and simple business rules could 
legitimately require companies to pay tax 
commensurate to the benefits provided. Ultimately, 
different tax rates would tend to reflect the quality of 
local institutions, infrastructures and the overall 
business climate. 
4. Conclusions 
The existing system for trans-border taxation of 
corporate income in the European Union produces 
large distortions in the allocation of capital and 
perverse incentives to engage in tax avoidance and 
profit shifting across member states. With growing 
internal market integration, compliance costs and the 
erosion of tax bases are likely to increase. This 
hampers the proper functioning of the internal market 
and justifies initiatives at Community level. 
An efficient tax system should have three features: as 
much as possible, it should do away with separate 
income accounting by tax jurisdiction and arm’s length 
pricing of intra-firm transactions; it should have a 
single common definition of the corporate tax base; 
and it should abandon effective income as the target 
variable in favour of normal income or some other 
presumptive measure of corporate activity. 
There is no need to harmonise tax rates within the 
European Union since tax competition between 
jurisdictions to attract productive capital is efficiency 
enhancing. Over time, corporate tax-rate disparities 
across countries are likely to diminish but will not 
disappear, since the location of investment responds to 
many factors, of which taxation is only one. On 
balance, corporate taxes will tend to approximate, or at 
least not significantly exceed, the net overall benefits 
of each location. National tax policies and 
administrative autonomy in tax administration can be 
preserved, with resulting benefits of flexibility, 
accountability to national electorates and fiscal 
discipline. 
There are two possible approaches to designing an 
efficient trans-border corporate tax system for the 
European Union. The first is to consolidate the EU-
wide operations of MNEs, using the agreed common 
base as the reference variable, and then to apportion 
this total tax base using some presumptive indicators 
of activity in each tax jurisdiction – hence, implicitly, 
of the likely benefits stemming from each location. 
The apportionment formula should respect requisites 
of neutrality between productive factors and forms of 
corporate financing. 
A radically different approach would be to design a 
fully decentralised system whereby each national 
authority would tax corporate activity at freely chosen 
statutory rates while using a common definition of the 
tax base. The common tax base would have to be an 
objective, easily measurable indicator of business units 
activity.  
Company taxation would have to follow ‘pure’ source 
principles, with moderate rates and no exemptions for 
interest payments or other cost items; all cross-border 
payments within MNEs or from them to shareholders 
would be tax-exempt. There would be no EU-wide 
consolidation; hence profit and loss offsetting would 
not be allowed. This may not be too serious a 
drawback, to the extent that one is willing to consider 
corporate taxation as a sort of counterpart to locational 
benefits and to recognise that, on efficiency grounds, it 
is better not to tax actual corporate income.  
Bibliography 
Bradford, D. (2004), The X tax in the world economy, 
American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy 
Research, Washington, D.C. 
Devereux, M. (2004), “Debating proposed reforms of 
taxation of corporate income in the European 
Union”,  International Tax and Public Finance, 
Vol. 11, No. 1. 
Devereux, M. and C. Keuschnigg (2009), The 
distorting arm’s length principle, Working paper 
No.10, Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation. 
European Commission (1997), A package to tackle 
harmful tax competition in the European Union, 
COM (97) 495, 1 October, Brussels. 
European Commission (2001a), Company Taxation in 
the Internal Market, Commission Staff Working 
paper, SEC (2001) 1681, 23 October, Brussels. 
European Commission (2001b), Towards an Internal 
Market Without Tax Obstacles, COM (2001) 582, 
23 October, Brussels. 
 6 | Micossi & Parascandolo 
Fuest, C. (2008), The European Commission’s 
proposal for a Common consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base, Working paper No.23, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation.  
Klemm, A. (2001), “Economic Review of Formulary 
Methods in EU Corporate Tax Reform”, in EU 
Corporate Tax Reform, Report of a CEPS Task 
Force, CEPS, Brussels. 
McLure, C.E. and J.M. Weiner (2000), “Deciding 
whether the European Union should adopt 
Formula Apportionment of Company Income”, in 
S. Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the 
European Union – Issues and Options for 
Reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McLure, C. (2002), “Replacing separate entity 
accounting and the arm’s length principle with 
formulary apportionment”, Bulletin of the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
Nicodème, G. (2009), “Corporate income taxations 
and economic distortions”, Taxation Paper No. 
15, European Commission, Brussels. 
OECD (1998), Harmful tax competition: An emerging 
global issue, Paris. 
Sadka, E. and V. Tanzi (1993), “A Tax on Gross 
Assets of Enterprises as a Form of Presumptive 
Taxation”, Bulletin of the International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation. 
Spengel, C. and C. Wendt (2007), A common 
consolidated corporate tax base for multinational 
companies in the European Union: some issue 
and options, Working paper No.17, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation. 
Weiner, J. (2005), “Formulary apportionment and 
group taxation in the European Union: insights 
from the United States and Canada”, Taxation 
Paper No. 8, European Commission, Brussels. 
 
About CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the most experienced and authoritative 
think tanks operating in the European Union today. CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, but its most 
distinguishing feature lies in its strong in-house research capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes 
throughout the world.  
CEPS’ funding is obtained from a variety of sources, including membership fees, project research, foundation grants, 
conferences fees, publication sales and an annual grant from the European Commission. 
Goals 
•  To carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to solutions to the challenges facing Europe today. 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business representatives across the whole of Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS carries out its research via its own in-house research programmes and through collaborative research networks involving 
the active participation of other highly reputable institutes and specialists. 
Research Programmes 
Economic & Social Welfare Policies 
Energy, Climate Change & Sustainable Development 
EU Neighbourhood, Foreign & Security Policy 
Financial Markets & Taxation 
Justice & Home Affairs 
Politics & European Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Trade, Development & Agricultural Policy 
Research Networks/Joint Initiatives 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes 
(ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
European Security Forum (ESF) 
 
In the context of its research programmes and networks, CEPS organises a variety of activities, involving its members and other 
stakeholders in the European policy debate, national and EU-level policy-makers, academics, corporate executives, NGOs and 
the media. These activities include task forces, conferences, lunchtime membership meetings, briefings, training seminars and 
major annual events (e.g. the CEPS Annual Conference).  
 
Website: http://www.ceps.eu 